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The Mirage of Microfoundations 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson 
If the project to bring “microfoundations” into strategic management and organizational 
analysis (Abel, Felin and Foss 2008, Felin and Foss 2005, 2006, 2009) simply means that we 
“we stress the need to build microfoundations rooted in individual action and interaction” 
(Felin and Foss 2009, p. 162) then we should applaud it.1 But this simple and valid 
proposition is complicated by added ambiguities.  
Strangely, this current project (a) ignores the failure in the 1970s of the project to build 
macroeconomics on secure microfoundations, (b) retains damaging ambiguities, and (c) is 
ultimately inconsistent in its own terms. I deal with these three issues in turn and focus on the 
insufficiency and rhetorical bias in their core claims and propositions.  
1. The failure of the microfoundations project in economics 
Mainstream economics has attempted to place economics on individualistic microfoundations. 
But this project faced insurmountable difficulties and essentially collapsed under the weight 
of its own internal problems. This episode has lessons for the current proposal.  
Starting from the assumption of individual utility maximization, Hugo Sonnenschein (1972, 
1973a, 1973b), Rolf Mantel (1974) and Gerard Debreu (1974) showed that the excess demand 
functions can take almost any form; there is no basis for the assumption that they are 
generally downward sloping. Furthermore, a general equilibrium may be indeterminate and 
unstable unless very strong additional assumptions are made, such as society as a whole 
behaves as if it were a single individual. As Alan Kirman (1989) has reiterated, the 
consequences for neoclassical general equilibrium theory are devastating. As S. Abu Turab 
Rizvi (1994, p. 363) explains, the work of Sonnenschein, Mantel and Debreu is quite general 
and is not restricted to counter-examples:  
Its chief implication ... is that the hypothesis of individual rationality, and other 
assumptions made at the micro level, gives no guidance to an analysis of macro-level 
phenomena: the assumption of rationality or utility maximisation is not enough to talk 
about social regularities. This is a significant conclusion and brings the 
microfoundations project to an end.  
A devastating consequence is the breakdown of the types of analysis based on individualistic 
ontologies where relations or structures are downplayed (Ingrao and Israel 1990; Kirman 
1989). 
                                                 
1 The author is very grateful to Markus Becker, Michael Cohen, Thorbjoern Knudsen, Dick Nelson, Sidney 
Winter and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on previous drafts. 
 - 2 - 
The microfoundations project in economics was based on the utility-maximizing individual. 
The work of James Coleman (1990) – which Teppo Felin and Nicolai Foss support 
enthusiastically – and of their co-author Peter Abell, also involves rational, utility-maximizing 
agents. Even if we overlook criticism of utility-maximization, there are further lessons from 
this former microfoundations episode in economics. While it is important and valuable to 
consider individuals and their psychology, we cannot get far by considering individuals alone. 
We have to consider relations between individuals as well. All social analysis requires some 
consideration of social structures, as well as individuals and their motivations.  
Given this, much “microfoundations” rhetoric is one-sided and misleading. While social 
relations are always present (even if covert) in social science discourse, they are still not given 
enough emphasis in economics. If they were there would be much more dialogue with 
sociology.  
2. Fateful ambiguities and further problems 
Much of the rhetorical power of the work of Peter Abell, Teppo Felin and Nicolai Foss in 
favor of their “microfoundations” project is based on statements such as the following: 
i. “Organizations are made up of individuals, and there is no organization without 
individuals.” (Felin and Foss 2005, p. 441) 
ii. “Specifically, there are no conceivable causal mechanisms in the social world 
that operate solely on the macro-level.” (Abell, Felin and Foss 2008, p. 491) 
iii. “We take the position – associated with „methodological individualism‟ – that 
the explanation of firm-level (macro) phenomena in strategic management must 
ultimately be grounded in explanatory mechanisms that involve individual action 
and interaction.” (Abell, Felin and Foss 2008, p. 492) 
iv. “Combining methodological individualism with an emphasis on causal 
mechanisms implies that strategic management should fundamentally be 
concerned about how intentional human action and interaction causally produce 
strategic phenomena.” (Abell, Felin and Foss 2008, p. 492) 
Apart from the questionable definition of methodological individualism – about which more 
below – I agree with all these statements. But despite their citation of some of the key 
material in the philosophy of social science, these authors consistently ignore ambiguities and 
problems that have been raised in this literature. The following statements (by me) are also 
true: 
v. There is no organization without social relations. 
vi. There are no conceivable causal mechanisms in the social world that operate 
solely on the micro-level of the individual alone. 
vii. Explanations of firm-level (macro) phenomena must be grounded in 
explanatory mechanisms that involve social relations, as well as individuals. 
viii. An emphasis on causal mechanisms implies that we should also be concerned 
with how intentional human action and interaction are themselves caused. 
Organizations are more than individuals: without social relations and social positions they 
would not be organizations. They would simply be aggregates of isolated individuals. So 
statement (i) has to be supplemented by the observation (v) that organizations involve social 
relations, and there is no organization without social relations.  
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Statement (ii) is also valid but inadequate. Ignored is the equally valid proposition (vi) that 
there are no conceivable causal mechanisms in the social world that operate solely at the 
individual level. The individual too is made up of component parts with biological, 
neurological and psychological causes. The supra-individual and sub-individual levels have 
also to be taken into account. 
Statement (iii) defines “methodological individualism” as if such a task were simple and 
uncontroversial. But the historical and analytical literature on the term reveals that it is deeply 
ambiguous and there is no consensus over its meaning (Udéhn 2001, Hodgson 2007). Among 
the several meanings used by its advocates are the following prominent options: 
(x) Social phenomena should be explained entirely in terms of individuals alone. 
(y) Social phenomena should be explained in terms of individuals plus relations between 
individuals. 
Although the difference may appear slight, it has enormous consequences. Emphatically (x) 
has never been achieved in practice: all viable explanations of social phenomena so far 
encountered involve relations between individuals as well as individuals themselves (Nozick 
1977, Arrow 1994).  
By contrast, the content of version (y) is acceptable, because of its inclusion of both 
individuals and social relations in the explanantia. But consider what it means: social 
relations as well as individuals are essential to explain social phenomena. Many social 
theorists define structures as social relations. Accordingly (y) is equivalent to the idea that 
social phenomena should be explained in terms of individuals plus social structures. Both 
versions of (y) invoke dual explanantia. So its description as “methodological individualism” 
is misleadingly biased towards one side of the story. It would we equally biased and 
erroneous to describe (y) as “methodological structuralism”. Neither is the term 
“methodological collectivism” acceptable. The problem with (y) is of labels rather than 
content. We always have to start from relations/structures and individuals. There is no other 
viable explanatory strategy. Biasing the label in one direction or the other is highly misleading 
(Hodgson 2007). 
Abell, Felin and Foss do mention individual interactions, and these necessarily involve 
social relations. So I assume they align with (y). But they seem unaware of the bias involved 
in labelling this as methodological individualism. They should also follow one of their 
mentors, Friedrich Hayek (1967. pp. 70-1) and mention such relations explicitly: 
The overall order of actions in a group is … more than the totality of regularities 
observable in the actions of the individuals and cannot be wholly reduced to them. … 
[The] whole is more than the mere sum of its parts … these elements are related to 
each other in a particular manner … [and] the existence of those relations which are 
essential for the existence of the whole cannot be accounted for wholly by the 
interaction of the parts but only by their interaction with an outside world ... 
Like others (Kontopoulos 1993, Weissman 2000), Hayek was clear that relations between 
individuals must be included in our social ontology. Unfortunately the aforementioned 
advocates of “microfoundations” are imprecise about the nature of the foundations upon 
which we have to build. I ask them to clarify their position on (v)-(viii), (x) and (y) above. 
Without such clarification we are invited into a swamp of ambiguity and rhetorical bias. It 
particular, to be even-handed, it is important for them to acknowledge the validity of 
statements (v)-(viii), as well as their valid emphasis on the individual.   
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3. Levels of analysis 
Statement (iv) emphasizes causal mechanisms and says we “should fundamentally be 
concerned” with “intentional human action and interaction”. But why is this individual level 
“fundamental”? As scientists, aren‟t we also obliged to examine the “nuts and bolts” of 
individuals as well? Aren‟t we also required to explain the causes behind individual capacities 
and intentions, or do we regard these as somehow uncaused, or beyond the reach of science?  
So far the answer of our authors to the final question is unclear. In another paper Felin and 
Foss (2011) argue for “free will,” some causal “wiggle room,” or “indeterminacy”. Hence do 
they regard intentions as (partially) uncaused, thus beyond the reach of (any eventual) causal 
explanation? Are intentions entirely caused or not? Personally I follow others in claiming that 
they are (Veblen 1919, Bunge 1959, Hodgson 2004). Do Felin and Foss by contrast believe in 
the uncaused cause? Does their rhetorical elevation of the individual among explanantia result 
from a belief that human intentions are somehow privileged in nature as causally 
undetermined? Again they are unclear.  
Science is about causal explanation. And all science tries to explain wholes partially in 
terms of their components. But complex wholes cannot be entirely explained in such terms. If 
they could, then there would be no such thing as social science. We would all have to be 
subatomic physicists, attempting to explain social and other phenomena entirely in terms of 
the most elementary subatomic particles. Different sciences exist precisely because this goal 
is beyond our reach: relations and interactions involve a multiple-layered ontology with 
emergent properties (Humphreys 1997) and processes that take place through time (Winter 
forthcoming). 
To settle on the individual as the “fundamental” unit of analysis is problematic. Why stop at 
the level of the individual? Why not get down to the neural structures in the brain? Or the 
biochemistry of the human organism? Or atomic physics? 
The same arguments concerning explanatory reduction from the macro to the micro, and 
from groups to individuals, apply equally to explanatory reduction from individual to gene, 
gene to molecule, molecule to atom, and so on. If we can reduce explanations to individuals, 
then why not further reduce them? To avoid this double standard one must either accept 
multiple levels of analysis, or reduce everything to the lowest ontological level – the realm of 
physics. If we admit multiple levels of analysis then there is no reason to assume that the 
social realm has one level only. Organizations involve emergent properties that render them 
additional units of analysis, while fully acknowledging that their very existence depends on 
individuals – just as the existence of individuals depends upon atoms.  
Although Abell, Felin and Foss point to some genuine limitations of the routines literature, 
their proposed “microfoundations” strategy is unclear and misdescribed. They rightly stress 
the importance of understanding individual psychology and motivations, but this point has 
already been stressed by many authors (including myself) and we do not need biased 
“microfoundations” rhetoric to establish this point.  
Accordingly, when Linda Argote and Yuqing Ren (forthcoming) identify “transactive 
memory systems” as part of the “microfoundations” they do not claim that they exhaust the 
explanantia. David Teece (forthcoming) does not have to reduce explanations entirely to 
individuals to make the point that individual entrepreneurship can be vital. Michael Cohen 
(forthcoming) points to the crucial role of habit – much in line with my own work in this area 
(Hodgson 2004, 2008) – but does not claim that habit the sole unit in terms of which 
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everything can be explained. “Microfoundations,” if it is a meaningful and operative term, 
cannot mean complete micro-reduction.  
Abell, Felin and Foss underplay the role of relations or structures in explanation and are 
unclear whether explanations can or should be in terms of individuals alone. Alternative 
accounts of routines do exist that are more in line with reputable philosophy of science.  
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